Introduction: The Return of a Forgotten Idea

The discourse around “One Nation, One Election” has moved from political rhetoric to constitutional inquiry. With the recent report submitted by the High-Level Committee chaired by former President Ram Nath Kovind, the proposal has returned to the centre stage. At its core, it seeks to synchronize elections to the Lok Sabha and all State Legislative Assemblies —a practice abandoned over five decades ago.

But for such a proposal to move from aspiration to implementation, it must first pass through the constitutional crucible. Can such electoral alignment be achieved without compromising the federal structure? Does the Constitution, as it stands, permit such restructuring? These questions demand rigorous analysis—legal, political, and institutional.

The Constitutional Architecture of Tenure and Elections

India’s Constitution provides for a parliamentary system of government, both at the Centre and in the States. The terms of the legislatures are governed primarily by:

• Article 83(2) – Lok Sabha’s term: five years from its first sitting.
• Article 172(1) – State Legislative Assemblies’ term: five years from their first sitting.
• Articles 85 & 174 – Powers of the President and Governors to dissolve the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies, respectively.
• Article 356 – Imposition of President’s Rule in case of breakdown of constitutional machinery in a State.

Crucially, the Constitution does not envisage a fixed or common election schedule. Each legislative body runs its own democratic clock, subject to its date of constitution and political contingencies such as mid-term dissolutions.

The Kovind Committee Report: A Legal Blueprint

Therefore, to align all these clocks to chime in unison, Parliament would be required to amend the Constitution in multiple places. More importantly, such amendments would need to satisfy the test of cooperative federalism.

The Kovind Committee has endorsed the idea of simultaneous elections as legally viable, subject to constitutional amendments. It recommends phasing the synchronisation through enabling legislation, followed by a transitional mechanism whereby the terms of certain Assemblies may be curtailed or extended to achieve uniformity.

The committee identifies several constitutional provisions that would require modification, including:

• Amendments to Articles 83, 85, 172, and 174 to allow for fixed terms or synchronized dissolution.
• A reworking of Article 356 to accommodate exceptions in case of premature dissolution of any House.
• Amendments to the Representation of People Act, 1951, which governs the conduct of elections.

These changes are not possible through ordinary legislation. They require a constitutional amendment under Article 368(2)—meaning a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament and ratification by at least half of the State legislatures.

Legal Feasibility vs. Constitutional Morality

While the legal possibility of simultaneous elections can be constructed through amendments, the real test lies in its constitutional morality—a term invoked by the Supreme Court to indicate fidelity to the values underlying the Constitution.

Two concerns arise. First, whether it is permissible to curtail or extend the tenure of a duly elected legislature to match another’s election calendar. Second, whether such a move would dilute the federal character of the Constitution by undermining the autonomy of State legislatures.

Historically, Indian courts have upheld that the will of the electorate, as expressed through periodic elections, is fundamental to democratic legitimacy. Any artificial adjustment of legislative terms could face scrutiny under the basic structure doctrine, especially if it is seen as compromising electoral equality or representative accountability.

Federalism at the Crossroads

India’s federalism is not symmetrical—States do not enjoy sovereignty akin to that of U.S. states. However, they are autonomous constitutional entities, empowered to govern and legislate independently within their fields.

Aligning elections would necessarily require a national political consensus—not merely legislative arithmetic. Regional parties, whose electoral strengths are rooted in local issues and identities, may find their democratic expression overshadowed by a nationalised electoral wave.

Further, the constitutional guarantee of a five-year term must be weighed against the political and logistical efficiencies proposed. Should a State Assembly be denied its full tenure merely for calendar uniformity? This question touches the core of representative governance.

The Practical Challenges: Between Law and Logistics

Even if constitutional amendments were passed, logistical implementation remains a herculean task. Conducting elections for the Lok Sabha and all State Assemblies on a single day would require:

• A massive deployment of security and personnel.
• Doubling or tripling of electronic voting machines (EVMs) and VVPATs.
• Simultaneous campaigning across a linguistically and politically diverse nation.

Moreover, the legal framework must provide for contingency elections in cases where Assemblies are dissolved mid-term. The Kovind Committee suggests “constructive vote of no confidence” and other stabilising measures, but these would require further legal innovation.

Conclusion: A Democratic Ideal or Disruptive Reform?

The vision of “One Nation, One Election” is attractive in its promise of efficiency, fiscal prudence, and electoral discipline. But its pursuit must not come at the cost of constitutional integrity or federal pluralism.

Reforms in a democracy must evolve through public dialogue, political consensus, and legal caution. To realign the democratic architecture of the world’s largest democracy is not merely a legislative project—it is a constitutional reckoning. The question is not only whether we can do it, but whether we should.

India’s democracy is complex, layered, and dynamic. Its strength lies not in uniformity, but in the capacity to accommodate difference. Any electoral reform must respect that diversity—not erase it.